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For investigators acting in the State or the private
sector, the gathering of digital evidence occupies
a steadily increasing proportion of work. A
principal and growing problem lies in the volume
of material obtained, and then extracting what is
considered to be relevant. This article will briefly
outline the approach that Bishop International
takes to digital data to advance the enquiries
made during the course of an investigation. It is
anticipated that the reader will acknowledge that
client confidentiality is paramount in such
matters. Many of the investigations lead to the
settlement of a case before litigation is
considered and others become a matter for law
enforcement. It is for those reasons that none of
the examples given in this article is in the public
domain. Nevertheless, the examples have
occurred, and will continue to occur, and the
anonymity afforded to the examples does not
detract from their relevance.
It is normal for digital material to be recovered as part of
almost every investigation. For purposes of this article,
it is presumed that the client has given their written
consent to enable the investigator to obtain access to
the relevant systems, that the imaging has been
correctly completed, that an audit trail is preserved and
that the evidence will be admissible. Regardless of
whether the potential litigation as the result of an
investigation will be civil proceedings or a complaint to
the police, the aim is to gather the evidence to satisfy
criminal standards of admissibility. Material will be
gathered from all those sources that can be viewed, and
the data will then be formatted to allow searches to
take place. The re-formatting always takes place with a
copy of the copy.
Before examining a number of examples, there are
some preliminary points to consider. First, there is the
issue of the timing of the investigation. The longer it
takes to locate the relevant hardware and take an image
of the stored information, the greater the risk of
sabotage by the suspects or their accomplices. For
portable devices, ensuring there is a record of custody
and anyone that might have access can be vital. For
example, when laptops are re-assigned to a new user
within an organization, the preservation of the original
hard drive will secure material for the future. This is, for
instance, particularly important when an employee
leaves a company.
Second, an investigation often exposes flaws in
existing procedures. Digital forensic investigations are
no exception. No system is perfect. Anyone with
expertise and access to a system or hardware will be
able to exploit them if they so choose. However, when a
digital forensic investigation takes place, it becomes an
ideal opportunity to conduct a security audit to prevent
any further exploitation.
Investigations inevitably include a thorough trawl of
international databases and the internet. It has been
suggested by some commentators that anyone can
obtain access to such material. However, a
comprehensive understanding of search techniques is
as important as an understanding of the investigation’s
objectives. The results of professional searches are
likely to identify additional potential sources of
information. Such work will generally have a direct
bearing on the later interrogation of the digital data that
is recovered.
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The contractors had unimpeded access to the entire system with
the ultimate result that the new system was manipulated by the
alleged fraudster, allowing fraudulent orders to be issued at the
expense of the client.
Evidence of bribes from a supplier
The first case involved a senior manager in one of
Britain’s largest companies. He approved very
significant contracts for services to the company. He
was suspected (via a whistleblower) of receiving bribes.
The purpose of the investigation was to provide
evidence of sufficient quality to justify his dismissal and
the withholding of his pension and share-incentive
scheme. The suspect had the use of a company laptop,
but the client took the view that he rarely used it.
Nevertheless, the client was persuaded of its potential
value as a source of evidence. An image of the hard
drive was taken, and the data searched using key words
selected from the results of the traditional form of
enquiries.
A range of useful material was found, and the most
striking document was a letter from a marine surveyor
valuing a £500,000 yacht. It was addressed to the
suspect at his home address. Interposed between his
name and his address at the head of the letter was the
name of a sub-contractor who had benefitted from a
series of lucrative contracts commissioned by the
suspect. This evidence was put to the sub-contractor
who confessed his involvement. As a result, the
company felt sufficiently confident in the results of the
investigation to report the matter to the police.
Substantial breach of contract
In the second case, an international trading business
was threatened by a mass resignation of important
members of staff, apparently intent on moving to a
competitor. Under extreme pressure of time, evidence
was required to support applications to the courts for
injunctions without notice to the other party in several
jurisdictions. Images were taken of many gigabytes of
data from servers, mainframes, laptops and organizers
around the world. Predictably, nothing so obvious as
letters of intent or contract terms were found – the
sensitivities of both sides were well known. Random
searches would have been too slow, too expensive and
offered limited prospects of success.
As in the first example, investigations of a traditional
nature helped to identify the relevant search terms for
the digital data. Investigators were put in place and
briefed. Potential sources of information were identified,
particularly previous employees of both businesses. The
patterns of behaviour of the most important members of
staff had been researched. Interviews were conducted
with confidential sources, which enabled targeted
searches to be conducted on the data retrieved. The
results enabled the client to resume control of the
situation and to resolve the matter on his terms.
Manipulating data for fraudulent purposes 
A third case demonstrates the risks inherent when
technology is employed without adequate security
controls. The client engaged contractors to modernize
its computer-controlled commissioning and delivery
processes. The contractors had unimpeded access to
the entire system with the ultimate result that the new
system was manipulated by the alleged fraudster,
allowing fraudulent orders to be issued at the expense
of the client.
To explain more fully: the system allowed the
assembly of finished products from the inventory of
components. At the start of assembly each item carried
a unique identity. Once the product was assembled, the
system was meant to initiate and monitor delivery to the
customer. However, certain mistakes in making entries
on the system would cause the order to be placed in an
error file, effectively losing it from the system, since the
error file went unchecked.
The alleged fraudster entered the system using
enhanced access and administration rights and placed
orders for assembly. However, once the order was
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processed beyond a point that it could not be cancelled,
but before the goods were uniquely identified, the
fraudster was able to manipulate the system. He caused
the order to be classed as an error and effectively go
unrecorded. Thereafter, in the absence of notification to
the assembly shop, the order could be made to proceed
to despatch without an identity. The items left the
factory despite a security procedure that required all
products to be cleared at the gate before leaving the
factory. The fraudster was well aware of weaknesses in
the security procedures.
The client identified a suspect based on his unusually
high level of access to the system and his supervisory
role in the plant. Research identified that, without the
company’s knowledge, the suspect had established a
haulage business and a wholesale operation selling
goods similar to those that were missing. Using
traditional investigative techniques, dockets were traced
to shipping manifests overseas. Specifications on those
dockets could potentially match missing stock. The
suspect had positioned himself within the company as
the informal point of contact for solving problems
between the manufacturing process and the IT system.
He had established close ties to a number of members
of staff in the IT department who, it was later
discovered, had given him unwarranted and extended
access to the system, enabling him to manipulate the
data and conceal the changes.
When a discrepancy was eventually uncovered, the
company, in its innocence, made sure that the still
highly-regarded suspect was actually one of the first
people to be made aware of it. He responded by offering
a complicated explanation of how the system had
malfunctioned. At the same time he also took steps to
delete any incriminating evidence from his personal
computer and laptops.
By the time the thefts had been confirmed and the
investigation had begun, the suspect had left the
company and his laptops had been reissued to other
members of staff. The IT department was requested to
find the original laptops, but despite several being
provided, the correct machine was not found. Whether
this was a result of incompetence or collusion with the
suspect remains uncertain. In either event, allowing the
recovery of the machines to be controlled by an internal
team in a piecemeal fashion frustrated the process and
may have allowed vital evidence to be lost.
The good news was that a secondary laptop was
recovered, and despite extensive cleansing of data, it
was possible to extract important evidence. The report,
which included both the digital forensic work and
parallel lines of inquiry, was ultimately presented to the
police, a prima facie case having been established.
Meanwhile the flaws in the system were addressed and
rectified. Improved audit procedures were initiated to
monitor the flow of orders and components to the
assembly shop and off the site more precisely. In
addition, all devices and the people to whom the
devices had been allocated began to be rigorously
logged.
Conclusion: an integrated approach 
The factor that unites the three examples in this article
is the need to provide a focus to any forensic
examination of digital information, and to integrate it
with more traditional forms of investigation to enable
digital evidence to be searched effectively. Material that
is recovered increases in volume exponentially. As the
proportion of irrelevant material increases, so do the
chances of missing relevant evidence if investigators
have failed to follow traditional investigative methods,
such as researching the background and speaking to
appropriate employees and others who have relevant
information.
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